High quality learning is extensive, well integrated, deep, and supports the use of knowledge in new situations that require adaptation of what has been learned previously. This book reviews current research on the nature of high quality learning and the factors that facilitate or inhibit it. The book addresses relationships between quality of learning and learners' dispositions, teaching methods, cognitive strategies, assessment and technologies that can support learning. The chapters provide theoretical analyses, reports of classroom research, and suggestions for practical (...) application for both teachers and learners. The book will be of value to teachers at all levels of education and provides guidance for students about how to approach classroom tasks in order to develop high quality learning. (shrink)

At his death in 1945, the influential German philosopher Ernst Cassirer left manuscripts for the fourth and final volume of his magnum opus, _The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms_. John Michael Krois and Donald Phillip Verene have edited these writings and translated them into English for the first time, bringing to completion Cassirer's major treatment of the concept of symbolic form. Ernst Cassirer believed that all the forms of representation that human beings use—language, myth, art, religion, history, science—are symbolic, (...) and the concept of symbolic forms was the basis of his thinking on these subjects. In this volume, which contains one text written in 1928 and another in about 1940, Cassirer presents the metaphysics that is implicit in his epistemology and phenomenology of culture. The earlier text grounds the philosopher's conception of symbolic forms on a notion of human nature that makes a general distinction between Geist and life. In the later text, he discusses Basis Phenomena, an original concept not mentioned in any of his previous works, and he compares his own viewpoint with those of other modern philosophers, notably Bergson and Heidegger. (shrink)

This essay reconstructs the steps by which Cassirer moved from the philosophy of language in the early 1920s to his more general theory of symbolism. The linguistic turn in philosophy overcame idealism without falling into naturalism or psychologism, but according to Cassirer proclaiming the primacy of language was one-sided. He claimed that language is but one symbolic form among many and, what is more, it is not the most fundamental kind of symbolism. The basic function of symbolism is neither “reference” (...) nor “pure signification,” but the unification of sensory phenomena in perception, a function he termed symbolic “Prägnanz.” The essay explains how Cassirer argued for a continuity of symbolic processes linking expressive perceptual qualities with scientific theory. (shrink)

Someone who has more sympathy with traditional empiricism than with much of present-day philosophy may ask himself: 'How do my experiences give rise to my beliefs about an external world, and to what extent do they justify them?' He wants to refer, among other things, to unremarkable experiences, of a sort which he cannot help believing to be so extremely common that it would be ridiculous to call them common experiences. He mainly has in mind sense-experiences, and he thinks of (...) them in a particular way. His way of thinking of them, roughly speaking as something 'inner', is one on which recent logico-linguistic philosophy has thrown a good deal of light. The relevant special notion of an experience contrasts, among other things, with a certain more general biographical notion of an experience, which some dictionaries indicate by the definition, 'an event of which one is the subject'. This book explores the concept of experiences, focusing on the disjunctions between perception and illusion. (shrink)

This article discusses ethical implications for the academy in the use of cyberspace and virtual reality in conducting its teaching and research responsibilities. It identifies important cyberspace ethics concerns as they intersect with the academy and provides an ethical framework for coming to grips with them. Topics discussed here include the sine qua non of academic collegiality and civility, concerns about digital alteration of images and sounds, and issues pertaining to academic administration and infrastructure.

Ontologically, brains are more basic than mental representations. Epistemologically, mental representations are more basic than brains and, indeed, all other non-mental entities: it is, and must be, on the basis of mental representations that we know anything about non-mental entities. Since, consequently, mental representations are epistemically more fundamental than brains, the former cannot possibly be explained in terms of the latter, notwithstanding that the latter are ontologically more fundamental than the former. There is thus an explanatory gap, notwithstanding the presumptive (...) truth of materialism. (shrink)

Key terms of analytic philosophy defined.

An analysis of Gibbon's five signs of civilizational decay.

Academic journals are clogged with gratuitous scholarship. This prevents the advancement of the corresponding disciplines in many ways, five of which are identified in this short work.

According to David Hume, the concept of causation and probability are to be understood in terms of the concepts of similarity and repetition. In this book, it is shown that they are to be understood in terms of the concept of continuity. One corollary is that there is no legitimate basis for skepticism concerning the legitimacy of inductive inference. Another is that anti-realism about theoretical entities is misconceived.

If It isn’t necessary, its non-existence is.

The most important laws of the propositional calculus are clearly and succinctly stated.

Someone afflicted by mental illness is neurotic if he sees his symptoms as symptoms and psychotic if does not. A neurosis is therefore an 'ego-dystonic' mental illness, meaning that the viewpoint embodied in one's symptoms is not the viewpoint of the ego of the afflicted party. And a psychosis is therefore an 'ego-syntonic' illness, meaning that the viewpoint embodied in the symptoms coincides with that of the afflicted party's ego. Whereas ego-syntonic illnesses are unqualifiedly debilitating, ego-dystonic are sometimes adaptive and, (...) within limits, may enhance the subject's ability to deploy his abilities. In this lecture, it is explained why this is so. (shrink)

We may dislike or disapprove of criminals who are genuine doers, as opposed to drifters; but we do not hold them in contempt. We hold them in contempt when, and only when, they are drifters. And in almost cases, that is precisely what they are.

According to Russell, '... the phi ...' means: 'exactly one object has phi and ... that object ...'. Strawson pointed out that, if somebody asked how many kings of France there were, it would be deeply inappropriate to respond by saying '... the king of France ...': the respondent appears to be presupposing the very thing that, under the circumstances, he ought to be asserting. But it would seem that if Russell's theory were correct, the respondent would be asserting exactly (...) what he was asked to assert. So Russell's theory wrongly predicts that the respondent's answer will be appropriate. Russellians deal with this by saying that this anti-Russellian intuition embodies our reaction not to what is semantically encoded in the respondent's words, but to what is pragmatically imparted by them. So Russell's theory is correct: the fact that it appears wrong is due to the distorting effects of pragmatics. In this paper I show that pragmatic phenomena cannot possibly be responsible for the just mentioned anti-Russellian intuition. No matter how hard we try to put the blame on pragmatics, Russell's theory still falls short. It follows that defi nite descriptions really are what they appear to be: referring expressions. I argue that defi nite descriptions are complex demonstratives; and, within that framework, I deal with cases where defi nite descriptions appear to be functioning non-referentially. I also solve Frege's puzzle within the framework defi ned by my treatment of defi nite descriptions taken in conjunction with Kripke-Kaplan semantics. (shrink)

Philosophy is the analysis of the categories in terms of which we understand the world. Analytic philosophy is simply philosophy that is pursued with a high degree of awareness of what philosophy is. Contrary to what Wittgenstein alleges, analytic philosophy is not linguistic philosophy; for it is only to the quite limited extent that meaning-analysis takes the form of sentential analysis that the latter falls within the bailiwick of analytic philosophy.

It is established that bullshit is institutional truth that is not actual truth.

Freud divided people in three libidinal types: narcissist (doer), obsessional (thinker), and libidinal (lover). Kirk (narcissist), Spock (obsessional) and McCoy (libidinal) complemented each other, giving the show depth and balance.

Traces the development of the idea of experience (Greek peira, empeiria) in Greek thought, from its origins in the Presocratics, through Aristotle and subsequent Peripatetics (Theophrastus, Alexander of Aphrodisias), to Galen. Particular emphasis is placed on the ideas of the medical school of the Empirics, who based their theory and practice on experience and memory. This experience-based epistemology can be traced back to the “epistemic modesty” characteristic of Archaic Greek thought. Some passages in Avicenna, redolent of Sufism, which react to (...) perceived shortcomings in the Aristotelian theory of cognition and demonstration (especially the ineffability of individuals) may have been influenced by the medical Empirist tradition. This emphasis on experience, shared by Archaic Greek thought, medical Empirism, and by certain aspects of Buddhism, may have influenced Islamic Sufism, and hence the thought of Avicenna and his successors. (shrink)

The behavior of individuals who compose an institution tends to mirror the behavior of that institution as a whole. This short work illustrates this principle.

The theorems of the propositional calculus and the predicate calculus are stated, and the analogous principles of Boolean Algebra are identified. Also, the primary principles of modal logic are stated, and a procedure is described for identifying their Boolean analogues.

If more than a tiny minority of people were non-bureaucrats, civilization would not be possible.

For intellectuals, and probably others, one form of escapism is a kind of constricted and shallow hyper-realism—the hyper-realism of having a dead-end job, even though one has a PhD or an IQ of 170. And that sort of hyper-realism is pseudo-realism, because realism is not about having a bad life; it is having the courage to have a good life, which the intellectual with the dead end job does not have.

Les sciences empiriques font des suppositions qu'elles ne sont pas elles-mêmes capables de justifier. La philosophie justifie ces hypothèses; C'est son travail.

A system is counterentropic to the extent that it has a fractal structure and entropic to the extent that it doesn't.

Según David Hume, el concepto de causalidad y probabilidad debe entenderse en términos de los conceptos de similitud y repetición. En este libro, se demuestra que deben ser entendidos en términos del concepto de la continuidad. Un corolario es que no existe una base legítima para el escepticismo sobre la legitimidad de la inferencia inductiva. Otra es que el anti-realismo sobre las entidades teóricas es erróneo.

The truly important parts of economics without the usual fluff. Each point is followed by a brief multiple-choice quiz, ensuring that knowledge is sealed in.

According to Russell, '... the phi ...' means: 'exactly one object has phi and ... that object ...'. Strawson pointed out that, if somebody asked how many kings of France there were, it would be deeply inappropriate to respond by saying '... the king of France ...': the respondent appears to be presupposing the very thing that, under the circumstances, he ought to be asserting. But it would seem that if Russell's theory were correct, the respondent would be asserting exactly (...) what he was asked to assert. So Russell's theory wrongly predicts that the respondent's answer will be appropriate. Russellians deal with this by saying that this anti-Russellian intuition embodies our reaction not to what is semantically encoded in the respondent's words, but to what is pragmatically imparted by them. So Russell's theory is correct: the fact that it appears wrong is due to the distorting effects of pragmatics. In this paper I show that pragmatic phenomena cannot possibly be responsible for the just mentioned anti-Russellian intuition. No matter how hard we try to put the blame on pragmatics, Russell's theory still falls short. It follows that defi nite descriptions really are what they appear to be: referring expressions. I argue that defi nite descriptions are complex demonstratives; and, within that framework, I deal with cases where defi nite descriptions appear to be functioning non-referentially. I also solve Frege's puzzle within the framework defi ned by my treatment of defi nite descriptions taken in conjunction with Kripke-Kaplan semantics. (shrink)

In this work, Descartes' metaphysics and epistemology are clearly stated and assiduously analyzed. It is shown that Descartes' epistemic foundationalism is tenable, and that his mind-body dualism is correct if taken to concern the relationship of mentalistic (mind-related) data to physicalistic data, even though it is incorrect if taken to concern the relationship of mind per se to body per se. Descartes' analysis of causation is shown to be correct, notwithstanding the copious criticism to which centuries have subjected it. Descartes (...) arguments for God's existence are clearly stated and, thereby, shown to be masterpieces of dialectical ingenuity. (shrink)

Dishonesty with oneself makes one unable to act. Honesty with oneself makes one able to act.

It is often said that (M) "mind is an emergent property of matter." M is ambiguous, the reason being that, for all x and y, "x is an emergent property of y" has two distinct and mutually opposed meanings, namely: (i) x is a product of y (in the sense in which a chair is the product of the activity of a furniture-maker); and (ii) y is either identical or constitutive of x, but, relative to the information available at a (...) given time t, x-statements are not analytic consequences of y-statements. If M is taken to mean that matter produces mind, then M is false, since biological activity obviously mediates mental activity and is therefore either identical with it or constitutive of it. If M is taken to mean that statements about mind are not analytic consequences of statements about matter, then M, though true with respect to the ontological relationship with between physical objects and the mental objects mediated thereby, says nothing about how statements about the physical bear on statements about the mental. This is a consequence of the fact that it is truths that are explained, not objects. (It is truths about trees, and not the tree per se, that are explained: one explains why the tree is tall, why the tree can't survive if the drought continues, etc.) So supposing that M is taken to mean that, relative to the information available at a given time, psychological truths are not derivable from non-psychological truths, then M is to the effect that, at that time, it isn't known how, or even whether, truths of the first kind bear on those of the second, in which case M is to the effect that it isn't known how to explain the mental in terms of the physical. Thus, depending on how it is disambiguated, M is either false or devoid of content. Further, as Hempel (1965) made clear, if M is taken to mean that, at a given time, statements about the mental cannot be deduced from statements about the physical, then it is ipso facto being left open whether, at some later time, relative to a more comprehensive data-set, statements about the mental are deducible from statements about the physical. A consequence of this, as Hempel stated, is that, if M is disambiguated in the second way, it is not to the effect that statements about the mental are incapable of being deduced from statements about the physical, and is instead to the effect that, at the time M is affirmed, it simply isn't known whether, or therefore how, such a deduction can be carried. And this establishes---what has already been established on independent grounds---that M is devoid of content if interpreted as a thesis concerning the way in which statements about the physical bear on---or, a fortiori, are explanatory of---statements about the mental. Thus, the statement that "mind is an emergent property of matter" is vacuous, so far as it isn't false. (shrink)

Paranoia is obsessive fear, and obsessive fear is unconscious desire.

This short work puts forth two answers to the question: In what ways are Jesus and Socrates similar? One of these answers is put forth by a Christian and embodies a deeply Christian perspective, and the other is put forth by two non-Christians, working jointly, and embodies a decidedly secular perspective. The question was first raised by the Christian author.

In this book, Kant's ethical system is clearly stated and carefully critiqued. In the process, cogent answers are given to the following questions: -/- *What is the relationship between self-interest and morality? *What is the relationship between morality and rationality? *What is the nature of rationality? *What is the difference between rationality and intelligence? *What is the relationship between awareness of moral norms and awareness of logical norms? -/- A must-read for anyone interested in philosophical psychology, moral epistemology, or Kant-interpretation, (...) this brisk monograph provides a long-overdue alternative to the dreary and opaque tomes on which Kant-aficionados have thus far had to rely. (shrink)

It is explained what it is for a statement to be logically true and it is thereby explained what it is for a statement to be formally true. It is also explained how logical truth differs from formal truth. Further, it is explained what a system of logic is. Finally, the nature of entailment is explained and, in particular, it is explained how formal entailment differs from analytic entailment.

What we call "neurosis" is psychosis about specific facts, but not about the logical instruments used to judge relations between facts. What we call "psychosis" is psychosis about both facts and the aforementioned logical instruments.

There is no difference between autonomy and non-psychopathy or, equivalently, between psychopathy and non-autonomy. Or rather, there is a difference, but it is tenuous, in that someone who is non-autonomous is non-psychopathic only as long the institution that hosts him is non-psychopathic. So his non-psychopathy, being borrowed, is both weak and ultimately devoid of reality.

Obsessions are internalized compulsions, and compulsions are externalized obsessions.